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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
=

=

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Priority No. 2
v.
CHARIS EASTMOND,
Case No. 960016-CA
Defendant/Appellant.

NATURE OF APPEAL AND JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from two second-degree felony convictions for
possession of a controlled substance in a drug-free zone and two class A
misdemeanor convictions, one for possession of paraphernalia in a drug-free zone
and the other for possession of marijuana in a drug-free zone. This Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995).
APPELLATE ISSUES AND REVIEW STANDARDS
1.

When the evidence showed that defendant committed the statutorily-

required elements of the crime, is she entitled to challenge her conviction by
exploiting an inability to prove a superfluous element in the jury instruction.
This issue was not before the trial court; therefore, no standard of review
applies.

2.

Did the evidence suffice to establish that the Saratoga resort was

"open to the public."
When evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, this Court
limits its review to "insuring that there is sufficient competent evidence as to each
element of the charge to enable a jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
defendant committed the crime." State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah
1991). This Court refuses to act as a "second fact finder" by judging afresh the
credibility of witnesses or veracity of competing stories. Id.
RELEVANT PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1995) is included in appendix A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Procedural History
After a day-and-a-half trial, a jury convicted defendant of two seconddegree felonies for possession of methamphetamine and cocaine, in violation of
subsection 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)! (R. 186). The jury also found defendant had
possessed or used marijuana, in violation of subsection 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), and had
possessed drug paraphernalia, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1995).
1

The increase in sentence by one degree occurred via subsection 58-37-8(5),
which increases sentences when the substantive offense takes place in a particular prohibited
location.
2

The State also charged defendant with committing these offenses within a "drugfree zone," which, under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(5) (1995) increases the
degree of punishment by one level.2
Statement of the Facts
EVIDENCE OF DRUG AND PARAPHERNALIA POSSESSION3
On August 3, 1994, police officers with the Utah County Narcotics
Enforcement Team executed a search warrant on a house located within the
boundaries of the Saratoga resort in Utah County (Tr. May 1, 1995 at 244) .4
During the search, they found several items of drug paraphernalia: finger scales,
syringes, burned glass tubes, a butane lighter with a torch nozzle, an empty film
canister, a hollowed-out light bulb, marijuana pipes, and a purse containing
marijuana leaves (R. 256-68, 260, 271). The crime lab found cocaine,
methamphetamine, and marijuana residue on many of the items (id.). The police
arrested defendant while searching the residence (Tr. at 244).

2

Subsection 58-37-8(5) does not use the term "drug-free zone." That term is a
shorthand reference for the various places, including schools, churches, and amusement parks
that, if drugs are used or possessed within 1000 feet, lead to a higher sanction.
3

Defendant does not challenge her conviction for possession or use of drugs and
paraphernalia, only the enhancement via the "prohibited place" provision. Therefore, the
information here given about the items found in her house is for background only.
4

The transcript is not paginated with the rest of the record.
3

THE "PUBLIC NATURE OF SARATOGA
During the summer of 1994, approximately 10,000 people visited Saratoga,
according to Michael Dortch, an employee of Saratoga Springs Development
Corp. (Tr. at 320). They were able to use the four swimming pools, the water
slide, the harbor, and volleyball and horseshoe courts (Tr. 314-18). Although
Saratoga's snack bar was not operating and no one was being charged for
admission, the company kept insurance payments current and the grass mowed to
accommodate youth groups, family reunions, and the "50 or 60 families that had
free run of the park, that just came and went as they pleased" (Tr. 319). Dortch
agreed with the prosecutor's assessment that the resort was not "open to the
public officially" (Tr. at 312). For a period of time, including August 1994, the
gates were locked (Id.). Though Dortch did not confirm this, according to
defendant, there were also signs posted outside the gate saying that the resort was
closed for the season (Tr. at 329-30). Management also did not allow
commercial activities, like company parties, on the premises (Tr. at 316).
Saratoga required that big groups give advance notice before they came to the
resort and almost daily there would be kids and adults at the park (Tr. 315).

4

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The evidence at trial showed that defendant possessed or used controlled
substances and paraphernalia within a "drug-free zone," shorthand for a list of
prohibited places in Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(5) (1995). Jury Instruction 11
used the term "open to the public," as a part of the definition of "drug-free
zone." Anomalously, "open to the public" is not found in the statute and, thus,
the instruction charged the jury with finding a superfluous fact, i.e., whether
Saratoga was open to the public. Under the statute, all the State had to do was
establish that Saratoga was an "amusement park" or "recreation center."
Subsection 58-37-8(5) includes these categories, which Saratoga readily fits
within. Therefore, because the evidence at trial established the elements of the
crime, whether the State was also able to show the superfluous element is
harmless error that should not cause reversal of the conviction.
Even if the existence of Jury Instruction 11 required the State to establish
Saratoga's "openness" to the public, the evidence provided the jury a sound basis
for reaching that conclusion. According to an employee of the resort, more than
10,000 people visited Saratoga that summer, all four pools were open, as was the
water slide, volleyball and horseshoe courts. Approximately 200 people had
"free run" of the park and use its facilities as they pleased. This evidence
5

sufficed to give the jury legitimate reasons to find that Saratoga was open to the
public.
ARGUMENT
I.

EVEN ASSUMING SARATOGA WAS NOT "OPEN
TO THE PUBLIC," THE EVIDENCE WAS
SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY THE STATUTE,
WHICH PROHIBITS DRUG USE OR POSSESSION
IN AMUSEMENT PARKS AND RECREATION
CENTERS.

Subsection 58-37-8(5) enhances punishment for those offenders who
commit drug-related crimes within 1000 feet of certain places, including public or
private schools, public parks, amusement parks, recreation centers.5 The term
"open to the public" does not appear in the law but the concept it establishes,
i.e., places where members of the public can gain access, is the predominant
theme of the list. Saratoga fits squarely into either the "amusement park" or
recreation center" categories. Indeed, few things other than amusement parks or
recreation centers would have a water slide, four pools, volleyball, and horseshoe
courts (Tr. at 315). Defendant does not argue otherwise.
5

In addition, the statute lists preschool or child-care facilities, public parks,
arcades, churches or synagogues, shopping malls, sports facilities, stadiums, arenas, theaters,
movie houses, playhouses, and adjacent parking lots, and public parking lots. The list
illustrates that the legislature's aim was to create "drug-free zones" especially around areas
where children tend to congregate. State v. Powasnik, 291 Utah Adv. Rep. 24, 25 (Utah App.
1996).
6

In reality, what defendant attempts to exploit is an anomalous situation
where the jury instruction requires proof of a fact not required in the statute.
However, in the course of proving that unnecessary fact, the State fully proved
the necessary facts under the statute, i.e., possession or use of controlled
substances in an amusement park or recreational area.
This anomaly is resolved via a harmless error analysis. Because the
evidence showed that defendant committed the statutory elements of the crime,
the State was not legally obligated to prove the resort was "open to the public."
That instruction was, therefore, extraneous and any failure to prove it harmless.
See Stejfenson v. Smith's Management, Corp., 862 P.2d 1342, 1346 (Utah 1993).
As the supreme court stated in Stejfenson, to be harmful error there must exist a
"reasonable likelihood that the error affected the result." Id; see also State v.
Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989) (discussing various types of error). The
error here, if any, was the trial court's including the "open to the public"
language but failing to include "amusement park" or "recreation center." Thus,
had there been no error, the jury instruction would have contained the proper
language, which would also have resulted in conviction. Defendant never claims
the evidence did not prove the statutory elements of the crimes.

7

Further, defendant should not be allowed to challenge an erroneous
instruction when the error benefits her case. Palmer v. State, 563 N.E.2d 601,
603 (Ind. 1990). The technical interpretation of "open to the public" defendant
claims is required is more difficult to prove than the statutory "amusement park"
and "recreation center" language. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has
twice dealt with a similar situation and both times determined that the error was
harmless because it benefitted defendant. In Floyd v. State, 829 P.2d 981, 984
(Okla.Crim.App. 1992), the trial court inadvertently added the word "loaded" to
a jury instruction describing the crime of a felon in possession of a firearm. As
the appellate court stated, the crime did not require the firearm to be loaded. Id.
The court refuted Floyd's challenge to the instruction on two grounds. First, he
had not objected at trial and, therefore, waived his appellate claim. Second, in a
statement directly applicable to defendant's appellate attack here, the Oklahoma
court ruled:
This error did not lessen the State's burden of
proof, but increased the State's burden by adding
another element to be proved. This error, which
actually benefited the defendant did not result in a
miscarriage of justice, and does not warrant reversal on
appeal.

8

Id. Similarly, here, subsection 58-37-8(5) does not require the amusement park
or recreation center to be "open to the public."
This year the Oklahoma court upheld its ruling in Floyd in a case where the
objection was not waived. In Davis v. State, 916 P.2d 251, 260
(Okla.Crim.App. 1996), the trial court added elements that raised the level of
intent the State was required to prove. On appeal, Davis claimed this addition
deprived him of fair notice of the charges against him. In rejecting that
argument, the court noted that he was not subjected to greater punishment and
that the new element did not constitute a "wholly different offense." Davis, 916
P.2d at 259. More importantly for purposes of this case, the Oklahoma court
reaffirmed the Floyd principle, stating that the "error actually benefitted] the
defendant," and, therefore, was of no "constitutional significance." Though
these cases differ from this one because there the additional elements were
unquestionably established, they support the general proposition that superfluous
elements are not an obstacle to an otherwise sound conviction.
Because the addition of the term "open to the public" similarly benefited
defendant (or at least could have benefited him), he was not prejudiced by the
error and her conviction should not be reversed on that ground.

9

H. THE EVIDENCE THAT ABOUT 10,000 PEOPLE
USED THE SARATOGA RESORT AND ABOUT
200 PEOPLE HAD "FREE RUN" OF IT SHOWS
THAT SARATOGA WAS "OPEN TO THE
PUBLIC."
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to establish Jury
Instruction No. 11, which defined "drug-free zone" as a "recreation area open to
the public, designed or intended for recreational use to which children are likely
to go" (R. 135). This is a unique, and improper, way to frame an insufficiency
challenge. Indeed, it is axiomatic that the essence of an insufficiency challenge is
questioning whether the evidence sufficed to establish the crime. State v. James,
819 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1991)
To counter the presumption that the record supports the jury verdict,
defendant, in her insufficiency claim, must show that the evidence is "so
inconclusive or so inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which
he was convicted." State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994). In
practice, this means the reviewing court must give great deference to the trier of
fact. In Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979), the United States
Supreme Court ruled that an appellate court must view "the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, [and decide whether] any rational trier of fact
10

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."
(emphasis in original). In other words, the defendant must establish that the
jury's conclusion is unreasonable, not just the least preferable. Here, even
though other juries might have reasonably reached a different result, defendant
cannot show that the jury's verdict was unreasonable.
The first practical step in showing that a verdict is unreasonable requires
defendant to marshal the evidence in favor of the verdict, accept all reasonable
and favorable inferences that can be drawn from it, and evaluate it in the "light
most favorable to the verdict." State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50, 55 (Utah 1993).
After compiling the evidence, defendant must list all evidence supporting the
verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is "legally insufficient." Ong Int'l
(U.S.A.), Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 457 (Utah 1993). Here,
defendant adequately restated the evidence before the jury, satisfying the first
part of the marshaling requirement. Nevertheless, she does not show the legal
insufficiency of that evidence to establish the guilty verdict; instead, she shows
the potential that a not guilty verdict might also have been reasonable.
Her challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence rests on Saratoga
employee Dortch's opinion that the resort was not "open to the public" during
August 1994, along with evidence of the gate's being locked, the no trespassing
11

signs, and Dortch's ability to exclude certain groups from access. Brief of
Defendant at 7. These factors may have legitimately led to a different verdict.
Nevertheless, just because a not guilty verdict may have been legitimate does not
mean the guilty verdict was illegitimate. To show that, defendant must establish
that the jury's guilty verdict was irrational.
The significance of the term "open to the public"
Defendant's attack on the rationale of the guilty verdict centers on the
phrase "open to the public." Dortch's testimony reasonably gave the jury
grounds to conclude that indeed, Saratoga was open to the public despite his
contrary claim.
Looked at from the perspective of Saratoga management, for whom Dortch
worked, Saratoga resort may not have been "open to the public": there were no
admission lines, entrance fees, nor 75,000 patrons, the gate was locked for a
period of time, and management controlled access at least to some extent.
Nevertheless, management's opinion does not drive criminal liability under
subsection 58-37-8(5). The fact of public use and access rules this decision and
Dortch's testimony contained sufficient evidence for the jury to make the decision
it made. The difference between Dortch's understanding of "open to the public"

12

and the jury's points to the different legitimate meanings the phrase can have. It
does necessarily mean that either Dortch or the jury were absolutely wrong.
To the jury, charged with an instruction that focused on the likelihood that
children would be present and the use of an area as a recreational center, "open
to the public" meant something different than what it would logically mean to a
businessman. Primarily, this is because the jury's deliberations were guided by
the entire instruction, not just the four-word portion defendant emphasizes. Jury
instruction 11 reads, in pertinent part: "a drug-free zone is any area within 1,000
feet of the grounds or structure of a recreation area open to the public,
designed or intended for recreational use to which children are likely to go"
(R. 135). Defendant attempts to take one piece of the instruction out of context
and make Dortch's interpretation of that singular piece the governing one.
However, it is more than likely that the phrases emphasized in bold all drew
particular attention from the jury.
From this holistic perspective, the phrase "open to the public" was only
one of several important concepts. Its "stand-alone" meaning probably changed
in the company of those other concepts. Given the overall evidence in the case
and the type of crime charged, "recreational area" and "children likely to go"
might instead have drawn the jury's attention more prominently. The evidence
13

readily established these concepts. First, defendant's house was inside the
recreational area, establishing the "within 1000 feet" mandate. Second, the
resort was a "recreation area." It had pools, a water slide, and a harbor along
with grounds that could apparently be used for picnicking. Dortch stated that
children, especially youth between the ages of 12 to 18 were there on a daily
basis so children were "likely to go" there. The "open to the public" part of the
instruction is more problematic. Whether the evidence could establish that prong
depends on the meaning a reasonable jury could give it.6
The federal counterpart to subsection 58-37-8(5) uses the term "open to the
public" in its definition of playground. 21 U.S.C. § 860(d)(1). The color that
term has acquired in federal cases supports the meaning suggested here and the

6

Under Utah law of criminal trespass, "open to the public" has a narrow
meaning. In Steele v. Breinholt, 747 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah App. 1987), this Court adopted the
Oregon statutory definition of the term.
'Open to the public' means premises which by their physical nature, function,
custom, usage, notice or lack thereof or other circumstances at the time would
cause a reasonable person to believe no permission to enter or remain is
required.
(quoting Or.Rev.Stat. § 164.205(4) (1983)). That narrow meaning, however, does not
automatically transfer to this case. In the criminal trespass statute, "open to the public" limits
the circumstances in which a person can be guilty of the offense. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6206(4)(a) (1995) makes it a defense to prosecution if the "property [upon which the person
trespassed] was open to the public when the actor entered or remained." Neither Steele nor
the criminal trespass statute make the narrow definition of the term the only available one.

14

reasonableness of the definition the jury implicitly adopted.7 In United States v.
Horsley, 56 F.3d 50, 52 (11th Cir. 1995), the federal court of appeals discounted
the defendant's challenge to the "open to the public" aspect of his conviction,
which relied on a posted sign at the entrance that read: "This is not a public
playground. Play at your own risk." Id. The court instead ruled that a witness'
testimony that the "park was accessible to and, in fact, used by many of the
children in the neighborhood" presented sufficient evidence for the issue to go to
the jury. Id.
Horsley's reliance on the posted sign is strikingly similar to defendant's
reliance on Dortch's opinion that Saratoga was not open to the public and
defendant's recollection of no trespassing signs. Implicit in the Horsley decision
is the axiom that no single piece of evidence can either preclude or impose a jury
finding in a fact-sensitive issue. In this light, "open to the public" is best seen as
a limiting phrase that restricted the jury's ability to convict if it found that
Saratoga was purely private property; in essence, an extremely large and childfriendly backyard or Utah's counterpart to Michael Jackson's Neverland.
Defendant points to no evidence that shows this to be the case. A significant
7

In Powasnik, this Court ruled that federal case law "serves as persuasive
authority" in cases under subsection 58-37-8(5) because the state law was modeled after the
federal statute. Powasnik, 291 Utah Adv. Rep. at 25.
15

number of people were able to visit and use the facilities, though some of them
may have needed to make prior arrangements.8 As the court stated in Horsley,
the evidence established that the resort was accessible and, in fact, many children
used it. Horsley, 56 F.3d at 52.
Ultimately, any challenge to sufficiency comes down to the reasonableness
of the jury verdict. See State v. Powell, 872 P.2d 1026, 1033 (Utah 1994)
(verdict upheld because jury verdict was reasonable). With the evidence before
it, this jury's conclusion that Saratoga was "open to the public" was a reasonable
one. Not only did a large number of people routinely use the resort for special
occasions, like reunions, parties, but many people, including children, also used
it for daily recreation (Tr. at 319).

8

The need for large groups to give advance notice does not transmute Saratoga
into a recreation center not "open to the public." It is not unusual for public parks,
amusements center, etc. to require advance notice or reservations.

16

CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed.9
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS J S ^ d a y of August 1996.
JAN GRAHAM
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

JAMES H. BEADLES
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appeals Division

9

Defendant asserts that her convictions should be reversed. However, even were
she to succeed on the merits of her appeal, complete reversal is not the appropriate remedy.
Because she challenges only the "drug-free zone" aspect of her conviction, the correct remedy
would be to reverse only the enhancement that resultedfromthe jury's finding on that
element. Powasnik, 291 Utah Adv. Rep. at 26. Defendant's convictions would be reduced
one degree.
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ADDENDUM

1
58-37-8. Prohibited acts - Penalties.
(1) Prohibited acts A - Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and
intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, manufacture, or
dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to
distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(iii) possess a controlled substance in the course of his business as a sales representative of a
manufacturer or distributor of substances listed in Schedules II through V except that he may
possess such controlled substances when they are prescribed to him by a licensed practitioner; or
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a
second or subsequent conviction of Subsection (l)(a) is guilty of afirstdegree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a third degree
felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction punishable under this subsection is guilty of
a second degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A misdemeanor and upon a
second or subsequent conviction punishable under this subsection is guilty of a third degree
felony.
(2) Prohibited acts B - Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance,
unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while
acting in the course of his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsection;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, room, tenement,
vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied
by persons unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in any of those
locations;
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to be present where controlled substances are
being used or possessed in violation of this chapter and the use or possession is open, obvious,
apparent, and not concealed from those present; however, a person may not be convicted under
this subsection if the evidence shows that he did not use the substance himself or advise,
encourage, or assist anyone else to do so; any incidence of prior unlawful use of controlled
substances by the defendant may be admitted to rebut this defense;

(c) 1953-1996 by Michie, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved.

2
(iv) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged prescription or
written order for a controlled substance;
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and intentionally to prescribe,
administer, or dispense a controlled substance to a juvenile, without first obtaining the consent
required in Section 78-14-5 of a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco parentis of the
juvenile except in cases of an emergency; for purposes of this subsection, a juvenile means a
"minor" as defined in Section 78-3a-103, and "emergency" means any physical condition
requiring the administration of a controlled substance for immediate relief of pain or suffering;
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and intentionally to prescribe or
administer dosages of a controlled substance in excess of medically recognized quantities
necessary to treat the ailment, malady, or condition of the ultimate user; or
(vii) for any person to prescribe, administer, or dispense any controlled substance to another
person knowing that the other person is using a false name, address, or other personal
information for the purpose of securing the same.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, or marijuana, if the amount is more than 16
ounces, but less than 100 pounds, is guilty of a third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin from any part of the
plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior
boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1 or any
public jail or other place of confinement shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than
provided in Subsection (2)(b).
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any controlled substance by a
person previously convicted under Subsection (2)(b), that person shall be sentenced to a one
degree greater penalty than provided in this subsection.
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other controlled
substances not included in Subsection
(2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including less than one ounce of
marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction for possession of a
controlled substance as provided in this subsection, the person is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction he is guilty of a third degree felony.
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsections (2)(a)(ii) through (2)(a)(vii) is:
(i) on afirstconviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony.
(3) Prohibited acts C - Penalties:
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(a) It is unlawful for any person:
(i) who is subject to this chapter to distribute or dispense a controlled substance in violation
of this chapter;
(ii) who is a licensee to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance to another
licensee or other authorized person not authorized by his license;
(iii) to omit, remove, alter, or obliterate a symbol required by this chapter or by a rule issued
under this chapter;
(iv) to refuse or fail to make, keep, or furnish any record, notification, order form, statement,
invoice, or information required under this chapter; or
(v) to refuse entry into any premises for inspection as authorized by this chapter.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) shall be punished by a civil penalty
of not more than $5,000. The proceedings are independent of, and not in lieu of, criminal
proceedings under this chapter or any other law of this state. If the violation is prosecuted by
information or indictment which alleges the violation was committed knowingly or intentionally,
that person is upon conviction guilty of a third degree felony.
(4) Prohibited acts D - Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance a license
number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of
obtaining a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to be, a
manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized
person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the administration of,
to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any person known to be attempting to
acquire or obtain possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled substance by
misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled substance from
another source,fraud,forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or to
utter the same, or to alter any prescription or written order issued or written under the terms of
this chapter;
(iv) to furnish false or fraudulent material information in any application, report, or other
document required to be kept by this chapter or to willfully make any false statement in any
prescription, order, report, or record required by this chapter; or
(v) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other thing designed to
print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or
device of another or any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling
so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (4)(a) is guilty of a third degree felony.
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(5) Prohibited acts E - Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under this
chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a,
Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under Subsection (5)(b) if the
act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds of any of those
schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or post-secondary institution or on the grounds of
any of those schools or institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or grounds which are,
at the time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution
under Subsections (5)(a)(i) and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center;
(vi) in a church or synagogue;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, or
parking lot or structure adjacent thereto;
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure;
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included in Subsections (5)(a)(i)
through (viii); or
(x) with a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where the act occurs.
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of a first degree felony and shall be
imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the penalty that would otherwise have been
established but for this subsection would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution
of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for parole until the minimum
term of imprisonment under this subsection has been served.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would have been less than
a first degree felony but for this subsection, a person convicted under this subsection is guilty of
one degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the actor mistakenly believed
the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense or was unaware of the
individual's true age; nor that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act
occurred was not as described in Subsection (5)(a) or was unaware that the location where the act
occurred was as described in Subsection (5)(a).
(6) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B misdemeanor.
(7) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense unlawful under this chapter
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is upon conviction guilty of one degree less than the maximum penalty prescribed for that
offense.
(8) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and not in lieu of,
any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law.
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of another state,
conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for the same act is a bar to
prosecution in this state.
(9) (a) When it appears to the court at the time of sentencing any person convicted under this
chapter that the person has previously been convicted of an offense under the laws of this state,
the United States, or another state, which if committed in this state would be an offense within
this chapter and it appears that probation would not be of benefit to the defendant or that
probation would be contrary to the interest, welfare, or protection of society, the court,
notwithstanding Section 77-18-1, may if there is compliance with Subsection (9)(b), impose a
minimum term to be served by the defendant, of up to 1/2 the maximum sentence imposed by
law for the offense committed. For violations of this section, this subsection supersedes Section
77-18-4.
(b) (i) Before any person may be sentenced to a minimum term as provided in Subsection
(9)(a), the prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an indictment, shall cause to be subscribed upon
the complaint, in misdemeanor cases, or the information or indictment, in addition to the
substantive offense charged, a statement setting forth the alleged past conviction of the defendant
and specifically stating the date and place of conviction and the offense of which the defendant
was convicted. The allegation shall be presented to the defendant at the time of his arraignment,
or afterwards by leave of court, but in no event later than two days prior to the trial of the offense
charged or the defendant's entering a plea of guilty. At the time of arraignment or a later date
when granted by the court, the court shall read the allegation of the previous conviction to the
defendant, provide him or his counsel with a copy of it, and explain to the defendant the
consequences of the allegation under Subsection (9)(a). The allegation of the past conviction of
the defendant is not admissible in a jury trial, except where the admissibility in evidence of a
previous conviction is otherwise recognized as admissible by law.
(ii) The court, following conviction of the defendant of the substantive offense charged and
prior to imposing sentence, shall inform the defendant of its decision to impose a minimum
sentence under Subsection (9)(a) and inquire as to whether the defendant admits or denies the
previous conviction. If the defendant denies the previous conviction, the court shall afford him an
opportunity to present evidence showing that the allegation of the past conviction is erroneous or
the conviction was lawfully vacated or the defendant was pardoned. The evidence shall be made
a matter of record. Following the evidence, the court shall make a finding as to whether the
defendant has a previous conviction, which finding is final, except for a showing of abuse of
discretion. Following the findings by the court, the defendant shall be sentenced under
Subsection (9)(a) or under the appropriate penalty provided by law, as the court in its discretion
determines.
(c) Any person sentenced on a second offense to probation who violates that probation is
subject to Subsections (9)(a) and (9)(b).
(d) For violations of this section, Subsection (9) supersedes Section 76-3-203.5.
(10) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which shows a
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person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a controlled
substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that the person or persons did so with
knowledge of the character of the substance or substances.
(11) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the course of his
professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, dispensing, or administering
controlled substances or from causing the substances to be administered by an assistant or
orderly under his direction and supervision.
(12) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on:
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who manufactures, distributes,
or possesses an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by
a registered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of his employment.
(13) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any person or
circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without the
invalid provision or application.
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